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Abstract
Financial statement fraud has cost market participants, including investors, employees, creditors, and 
pensioners. Capital market participants expect active and vigilant corporate governance to ensure the quality, 
integrity, and transparency of financial information. Financial statement fraud is a serious threat to market 
participants’ confidence in published audited financial statements. Financial statement fraud has recently 
received considerable attention from the business community, accounting profession, academicians, and 
regulators. This paper sheds light on the factors that may increase the likelihood of financial statement fraud. 
This study empirically tests the impact of board of commissioners and audit committee effectiveness, ownership 
structure, bank monitoring, and the firm life cycle on the probability of accounting fraud. Hypothesis testing 
was carried out by using logistic regression model using fraud data from BAPEPAM-LK (Indonesia Stock 
Exchange Supervisory Agency) during the years of 2005-2011. The result of this study indicates that the 
audit committee effectiveness and controlled family ownership reduce the fraud probability. However, the 
effectiveness of board commissioners, foreign ownership, bank monitoring, and the firm life cycle do not have 
any effect on fraud probability.
Keywords: fraud, board of commissioner effectiveness, audit committee effectiveness, ownership 
structure, bank monitoring, firm life cycle.
Abstrak
Kecurangan pelaporan keuangan menimbulkan kerugian bagi pelaku pasar, antara lain investor, pegawai, 
kreditur. Kecurangan ini juga merupakan ancaman yang serius bagi para pelaku pasar modal. Pelaku pasar modal 
mengharapkan laporan keuangan yang  transparan, berkualitas, dan dapat dipercaya integritasnya. Penelitian 
ini bertujuan menguji pengaruh efektifitas peran dewan komisaris dan komite audit, struktur kepemilikan, 
peran monitoring bank, dan siklus hidup perusahaan terhadap probabilita terjadinya kecurangan pelaporan 
keuangan. Pengujian hipotesis dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode regresi logistik dengan menggunakan 
data sanksi yang dikenakan pada perusahaan yang melakukan kecurangan pelaporan keuangan, yang diperoleh 
dari Bapepam-LK dari tahun 2005 sampai dengan 2011. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa efektifitas 
peran komite audit dan struktur kepemilikan keluarga berpengaruh negatif terhadap probabilita terjadinya 
kecurangan pelaporan keuangan. Hal ini mengindikasikan efektifitas komite audit dan kepemilikan yang 
dikendalikan oleh keluarga dapat mengurangi probabilita terjadinya kecurangan pelaporan keuangan.  
Kata Kunci :  fraud, corporate governance, efektifitas komite audit, struktur kepemilikan, pengawasan 
bank, siklus hidup perusahaan. 
Synthia Madya K and Ancella A.Hermawan, The Influence of Board of Commissioners and … 21
INTRODUCTION
Financial statements, which are required 
to be reported periodically, represent the 
company’s responsibility to inform its 
stakeholders about the company’s financial 
condition. As one of the information sources 
used for decision making by the company’s 
stakeholders, financial statements must 
provide reliable and relevant information. On 
the other hand, this important role of financial 
statements in such decisions also leads to 
moral hazard situation during the financial 
reporting process, for example in the case of 
Enron, WorldCom, and Kimia Farma. Those 
accounting fraud cases have raised questions 
about how governance mechanisms are able 
to ensure a company is well managed based 
on good corporate governance principles.  The 
existence of effective board of commissioners 
and audit committee should have a positive 
impact on good corporate governance 
practices. Yi et al. (2010) find that the board and 
audit committee characteristics have negative 
effects on fraud in the financial report. 
As a creditor, banks must manage their 
credit risks to minimize such risks.  Banks 
must have a high quality monitoring system 
to prevent the borrower’s misconduct which 
can result in a default position. Therefore, the 
role of bank monitoring can be considered as 
an external governance mechanism. Ahn and 
Choi (2009) find that a higher level of bank 
monitoring decreases the borrowers’ earnings 
management behavior. Therefore, bank 
monitoring could prevent borrowers from 
doing accounting fraud when preparing their 
financial statements. 
The company’s ownership structure 
should have an impact to the good corporate 
governance. Agency problems between 
management and owner may not occur in 
family firms, but may occur between majority 
and minority shareholders.  Family firms are 
usually owned and controlled by the family 
as the majority shareholders.  The governance 
mechanisms in family firms tend to not 
function optimally because there is no urgent 
need to monitor the management action from 
the shareholders perspective.  Less control 
and minority shareholders expropriation by 
majority shareholders could increase the 
probability of accounting fraud in the firm’s 
financial reporting.  Foreign ownership in 
the company is considered having a positive 
impact on company’s control because the 
company should follow stricter regulations 
from the shareholders’ home country. Foreign 
owner has more concern towards the increase 
of good corporate governance so that it can 
help with fraud prevention (Chen et al. 2006).  
The company financial performance 
tends to be different in different company life 
cycle stages. The profit reported will have an 
important role in the process of the performance 
evaluation at the mature and young company 
(Smith and Watts 1992). Therefore, there is 
a tendency that the manager of mature and 
young company will be motivated to do an 
income increasing or income decreasing 
earnings management in order to maintain or 
to increase the market value and to get a good 
performance evaluation.  Companies which 
do not face any difficulties in generating good 
financial performance should be less motivated 
to do any fraud.  
The contribution of this study is to conclude 
whether corporate governance related factors, 
such as governance structure and ownership 
structure are associated with the probability of 
accounting fraud. The other contribution is to 
examine whether the roles of bank monitoring 
on the borrowers prevent the accounting fraud 
and also whether the accounting fraud depends 
on the company’s life cycle. Compared to 
previous research, this study includes bank 
monitoring and life cycle of the firm, whether 
they are associated with the probability of 
accounting fraud. The result from this study 
confirms that an effective audit committee 
and a controlled family ownership reduce the 
probability of accounting fraud. 
The remaining parts of this paper will 
be divided as follows: Section (2) develops 
the underlying theory of board of director 
effectiveness, audit committee effectiveness, 
ownership structure, bank monitoring, life 
cycle of the firm, and the occurrence of 
financial statement fraud; Section (3) describes 
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the hypotheses developments; Section (4) 
describes the sample selection process; 
Section (5) details the research design; Section 
(6) contains the empirical results of the study; 
and Section (7) concludes the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Financial Statement Fraud
Most of previous studies have found 
that the quality of financial statement can 
be affected by the existence of earnings 
management. As Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
and similarly Schipper (1989) define, 
earnings management occurs when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transaction to alter financial reports 
to either mislead some stakeholders about 
the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on reported accounting numbers. 
Low earnings quality can result in  incorrect 
decision making. For example, in the context 
of IPO (Initial of Public Offering), investor 
may overpay  the shares because of this 
earnings management. Teoh et al. (1998) state 
that investment in firms with high earnings 
management tend to perform poorly in future 
periods. Earnings management is sometimes 
distinguished from earning manipulation 
since earnings tend to be managed by using 
discretionary accruals, which is based on 
judgment, but still comply to accounting 
standard. Earning management which violates 
the accounting standard compliance will be 
considered as accounting fraud. Perols and 
Lougee (2011) explain that a fraud exists if 
the manager uses his valuation when making 
the financial report and when it engineers the 
transaction so that the financial report will 
give a different result from the real economic 
situation of the company, and this act is done by 
violating the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). They find fraud firms are 
more likely to have managed earnings in prior 
years and that earnings management in prior 
years is associated with a higher likelihood 
that firms meet or beat analyst forecasts or 
inflate revenue.
Good Corporate Governance
Good corporate governance is expected to 
prevent the occurrence of financial statement 
fraud. Cheng et al. (2010) state that the main 
factors affecting the accounting fraud of listed 
companies are the ownership structure and 
internal governance control responsibilities. 
The good corporate governance principle is 
to make companies more accountable to their 
stakeholders. Therefore, companies that have a 
strong governance mechanism are expected to 
be less likely to do accounting fraud.
Board of Commissioners
One of the internal governance structures 
is the board of commissioners1  who has the 
main function to supervise and monitor the 
management action. The objective of good 
corporate governance can be achieved only if 
the board of commissioners can perform their 
responsibilities effectively. The effectiveness 
of the board of commissioners is affected by 
its characteristics, i.e. independence, activity, 
size, and competence (Hermawan 2009).
The purpose of having independent 
commissioners as the board member is to ensure 
the unbiased decision making to prevent the 
minority shareholders expropriation. Bhagat et 
al. (2008) state that the more independent the 
board of directors, the better the performance 
of the company. Ramos and Olalla (2011) 
also find that the existence of the independent 
directors have a positive effect towards the 
company’s performance when the company 
is run by the founder. Jia et al. 2009 find 
that inside director composition has positive 
relationship with the probability of financial 
statement fraud.
The meeting activity organized by the 
board of commissioners is one aspect that can 
affect the effectiveness of the monitoring role. 
The active board of commissioners, which 
regularly organizes meetings, will know the 
1   Indonesia adopts two-tier management system which 
completely separates supervisory function of the board 
of commissioners and executive function.  Therefore, 
the board of commissioners in this study is similar to the 
board of directors in the one-tier management system in 
other countries
Synthia Madya K and Ancella A.Hermawan, The Influence of Board of Commissioners and … 23
problems more in detail and earlier so that the 
monitoring will be more systematically and can 
be done earlier. Ramos and Olalla (2011) find 
that board meetings are positively associated 
with the company’s performance, but it will 
become weaker when the family business is 
run by the founder. The board size can also 
affect the effectiveness of the board.  Beasley 
(1996) finds the positive association of the 
board size and the possibility of fraud in the 
financial report. Klein (2002) finds that audit 
committee independence increases with board 
size. Cheng et al. (2008) find the smaller board 
size is better, and this condition will improve 
the performance of the company. Competence 
of the board members is an important factor 
for the effectiveness of the board. This 
competence will affect the ability of the board 
to carry out their monitoring functions. Some 
studies have shown that a negative relationship 
between expertise in the financial field and 
the probability of a deviation in the financial 
reporting, profit management, fault, and 
restatements (Cunningham 2007). Chen et al. 
(2006) also find that the chairman of the board 
who has only a partial experience will have a 
low capability to detect a fraud.
Audit Committee
In performing their duties, board 
of commissioner is supported by audit 
committee. The main purpose of the audit 
committee function is to ensure the quality and 
the reliability of financial report. Therefore 
the likelihood of accounting fraud should 
be reduced by an audit committee which 
performs effectively. Similar to the board 
of commissioner effectiveness, the audit 
committee effectiveness is also influenced by 
their characteristics independence, activity, 
size, and competence (Hermawan 2009). 
Persons (2005) finds some aspects of the 
audit committee, such as whether the member 
of the audit committee is the director of 
another company and the tenure of this audit 
committee member, have a direct implication 
towards the improvement of the corporate 
governance in the future. Bronson et al. (2009) 
find that the advantage of the independent 
audit committee can only be achieved when the 
whole audit committee is really independent 
(100% independent). Jackson et al. (2009) 
also conclude that the probability of fraud is 
negatively associated with the independent 
audit committee.
The activity of the audit committee 
represents whether the audit committee 
performs its function effectively. The audit 
committee activities are represented by the 
number of meetings that have been taken place 
by the audit committee in one year. Persons 
(2009) finds that companies that employ early 
voluntary ethics disclosure have the tendency 
to have a larger audit committee, a more 
independent audit committee, and an audit 
committee which organize more meetings, 
and also have lower tendency to exercise fraud 
in its financial report.  Lin et al. (2006) find a 
negative association between the size of audit 
committee and the occurrence of earnings 
restatement. Kalbers and Fogarty’s (1993) 
research suggests that a large audit committee 
tends to enhance the audit committee’s status 
and power within an organization.  
The competence that must be possessed 
by audit committee is the ability to have an 
adequate understanding of accounting, audit, 
and the system that are being applied in the 
company. The audit committee member must 
also have the ability and knowledge of how to 
analyze a financial report. Zhang et al. (2007), 
Hoitash et al. (2009), and Sharma et al. (2009) 
state that the audit committee with only a few 
accounting and financial expertise with no 
finance and accounting background is related 
with a weaker internal control of the company. 
Bank Monitoring
Banks have a specific interest for 
monitoring the borrower’s activities to manage 
their credit risk. Banks have some privilege in 
monitoring the borrowers because they can 
have the information needed directly from 
the borrowers. Ahn and Choi (2009) find that 
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a borrowing firm’s earnings management 
behavior generally decreases as the strength 
of bank monitoring increases. The strength 
of bank monitoring seems to be affected only 
by (1) the magnitude of a bank loan, (2) the 
reputation (rank) of a lead bank, and (3) the 
length of a bank loan. As stated by Perols 
and Lougee (2011), earnings management 
could becomes an indicator the firms that has 
conducted fraud, a company that have a high 
monitoring level by the banks should have 
lower possibility to commit accounting fraud.
Ownership Structure
Companies that are controlled by families 
have a structure which will lessen the agency 
conflict between the shareholders and the 
manager, and the creditor believes that 
companies which are controlled by families 
are more concerned with creditors’ interest 
and have less monitoring cost according to 
Fama and Jensen (1983). The result of Arifin’s 
(2003) study shows that the public company 
in Indonesia controlled by the family or by 
the state or by the financial institution has less 
agency problem if compared to companies 
that are controlled by the public or without 
a prominent controller. According to him, in 
companies that are controlled by families, 
there are less agency problems because of the 
decrease of conflicts between the principal 
and the agent. If the family ownership is 
more efficient and the agency is better, there 
is no problem between the interest of the 
agent and the principal, which means that the 
management will lead the company as well 
as possible for the benefit of the “family” so 
that the company will be run efficiently and 
honestly. Jiang and Peng (2011) find that the 
presence of CEO who has family relationship 
can enhance companies’ stock return (in 
Indonesia and Taiwan). Therefore, a company 
with a high family ownership will have a 
low tendency to conduct fault compared to 
companies that have a low family ownership. 
On the contrary, some studies suggest that 
higher family ownership raise other types of 
agency problem, i.e. between the family and 
non-controlling shareholders (majority and 
minority). This problem main induce family 
to commit accounting fraud to hide their 
expropriation of firms wealth. Higher family 
ownership has higher probability of financial 
statement fraud (Geriesh 2003).  Families are 
also capable of expropriating wealth from 
the firm through excessive compensation, 
related-party transactions, or special dividends 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003). DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) suggest that the 
family’s desire for special dividends can impact 
the firm’s capital expansion plans, leading to 
poor operating and stock price performance.
Contrary to the notion that family 
ownership increases other type agency 
problem between the family and non 
controlling shareholders, Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) in their studies found that the classic 
owner manager conflict in nonfamily firms is 
more costly than the conflict between family 
and nonfamily shareholders in founder CEO 
forms. Their studies emphasize that the family 
ownership will reduce the problem between the 
shareholder’s and agent to commit accounting 
fraud. Anderson and Reeb (2002) also found 
minority stockholders actually have advantage 
from family ownership, and minority share 
holders are not adversely affected by family 
ownership, suggesting that family ownership 
is an effective organizational structure.
Companies that are fully or partially 
owned by foreign investor usually should 
comply with the foreign regulation which is 
compulsory by the regulator of investor home 
country. The long distance location sometimes 
also needs higher quality of controlled 
system to enable the high return for foreign 
investor. The regulation concerning corporate 
governance in other country usually has higher 
standard than in Indonesia which is known to 
have weak corporate governance. Chen et al. 
(2006) explain that companies with foreign 
ownership tend to commit less fraud, because 
of the existence of foreign ownership, and the 
monitoring level is higher which will help to 
prevent fraud.
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Company Life Cycle 
The ability to generate profit in a company 
generally depends on the life cycle stages. 
During the introductory stage, company 
operation is usually unstable and therefore the 
profit is also uncertain. In the mature stage, the 
competition is usually more intense and the 
demand is not expanding anymore, therefore 
the company’s ability to generate profit is 
getting more difficult. 
Managers in companies which are in the 
growth stage of the life cycle generally will take 
steps to lessen profit if they feel that their profit 
is superfluous (Al Najjar and Riahi-Belkaoui 
2001). In companies that are in the mature stage 
of their life cycle, the investment activities 
are no more a priority and the operational 
environment is more stable if compared with 
companies that are still growing (Balkin and 
Gomez-Mejia 1987). The profit reported 
will have an important role in the process 
of the performance evaluation at the mature 
company (Smith and Watts 1992). Because the 
reported net income will become important in 
the performance evaluation, it becomes the 
bases for value management performance. In 
order to maintain or increase the market value 
and to get a good performance evaluation, the 
manager of mature company tends to increase 
their reported net income.  
Earning management has become an 
indicator to detect companies that have 
conducted fraud (Perols and Lougee 2011). 
Companies that are in the young life cycle stage 
(growth stage) will conduct a management to 
reduce profit, and companies that are in the 
mature life cycle have tendencies to maximize 
company’s profit.  According to the definition 
proposed by Perols and Lougee (2011), they 
define manipulation of the financial report or 
have been conducting a profit management (or 
both). Thus, companies that are at the young 
and mature stage will frequently commit fraud. 
Hypotheses Development
Board of Commissioners and Probability of 
Accounting Fraud
The effectiveness of the board of 
commissioners’ performance will prevent 
management from opportunistic behavior. 
The board of commissioners effectiveness is 
affected by its characteristics, i.e. independence, 
activity, size, and competence (Hermawan 
2009).  Chen et al. (2006), Wagner (2011), and 
Beasley (1996) examine some characteristics 
of the board and they find that there is a 
positive relationship between characteristic 
of the board with the quality of the financial 
report.  A financial report is considered to 
have a high quality if it can be relied upon as 
a source of timely and accurate information. 
High quality of financial reporting means 
that financial statements are free from fraud. 
Higher quality financial report should have a 
significant effect on reducing the likelihood 
of financial statement fraud (Beasley 1996). 
Therefore, an effectiveness score is made 
based on the four characteristics. The higher 
score of effectiveness will reflect the better 
performance of the board, which should be 
able to reduce probability of fraud.
H1a: Higher board of commissioners 
effectiveness score reduces the 
probability of accounting fraud.
 
Audit Committee and Probability of 
Accounting Fraud
The role of the audit committee is to 
ensure the quality and the reliability of 
financial report. If audit committee has an 
effective role, company should present higher 
quality of financial reports.  Bronson et al. 
(2009) and Jackson et al. (2009) state that 
the effectiveness of the audit committee will 
also affect some characteristics which are 
proven by previous study:  independence, 
activity, size, and competence of the audit 
committee. The purpose of audit committee 
is to monitor management performance, 
including company's operations and financial 
reporting. Higher quality of audit committee 
will also improve the quality of management 
performance, which ultimately leads to the 
good quality of financial reporting. Firm with 
higher quality of audit committee will result 
higher quality of financial report and will be less 
likely to be sanctioned for fraudulent reporting 
(Abbot et al. 2000).   Therefore, the likelihood 
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of accounting fraud should be reduced by an 
audit committee which performs effectively. 
An audit committee effectiveness score is 
also developed based on the characteristics of 
activity, size, and competence. Independence 
is automatically assumed for audit committee 
in Indonesia.
H2a: Higher audit committee effectiveness 
score reduces the probability of 
accounting fraud.
  
Bank Monitoring and Probability of 
Accounting Fraud
Bank as a creditor have some privileges 
in monitoring the borrowers because they can 
have the information needed directly from the 
borrowers. Monitoring of the bank can increase 
the quality of corporate governance. Ahn 
and Choi (2009) find that a borrowing firm’s 
earnings management behavior generally 
decreases as the strength of bank monitoring 
increases. The strength of bank monitoring 
seems to be affected only by (1) the magnitude 
of a bank loan, (2) the reputation (rank) of a 
lead bank, and (3) the length of a bank loan. 
This study used the reputation of bank to 
measure monitoring quality.
H3a:  Higher amount of loan from bank 
with high monitoring quality reduces 
the probability of accounting fraud.  
 
Ownership Structure and Probability of 
Accounting Fraud
Dispersed ownership structure is found 
only in the Unites States of America and Britain 
(Murhadi 2008). Whereas, in most developing 
countries, the ownership structure of company 
is under family control (concentrated 
ownership structure). Theoretically, family 
ownership reduces agency problem type I 
between management and stock holder (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976), however recent research 
show that concentrated ownership will result 
in emergence agency problem type II between 
majority and minority (Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1988). There are 2 (two) types of 
agency problem: the first type (Type I) is an 
agency problem conflict which arise between 
management (agent) with stock holder 
(principal), while the second type (type II) 
conflict arise between majority stock holders 
with minority stock holder.
La Porta et al. (1999) reported that 85% of 
companies in Spain are still under the family 
control. Likewise, in Indonesia, the majority 
of companies in the Indonesians are still under 
control of the founding family (Arifin 2003). 
Structure of family control ownership reduces 
agency conflicts between shareholders and 
creditors, and the lender assumes ownership 
of the family concerned to creditors, in the 
presence of control family, monitoring cost 
will be lower (Fama & Jensen 1983). Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) found that a company owned 
by the family has better performance because 
of the existence of family founders. 
Furthermore, company which is owned 
and controlled by family will have lower 
probability to do financial statement fraud. 
Arifin’s (2003) study shows that the public 
companies in Indonesia controlled by the 
family or by the state or by the financial 
institution have a less agency problem if 
compared to companies that are controlled by 
public or without a prominent controller. Jiang 
and Peng (2011) have evidence that the present 
of a CEO who has family relations will have 
higher equity return (in Indonesia and Taiwan) 
compared with companies in which the CEO 
does not have family relations. Higher equity 
return signed that investor (in Indonesia 
and Taiwan) has believed to management 
performance, in which the management has 
family relationship. The classic owner manager 
conflict in nonfamily firms is  more costly than 
the conflict between family and nonfamily 
shareholders in founder CEO forms (Villalonga 
and Amit 2006). Their study emphasize that 
the family ownership will reduce the problem 
between the shareholder’s and agent to commit 
accounting fraud. Anderson and Reeb (2002) 
also find minority stockholders who actually 
have advantage from family ownership and 
minority share holders are not adversely 
affected by family ownership, suggesting that 
family ownership is an effective organizational 
structure. 
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H4a : Companies which are owned and 
controlled by family have lower 
probability of accounting fraud.
The foreign capital ownership is one way 
to create good corporate governance. Usually, 
the foreign investors have a high standard of 
corporate governance in their home country. 
Due to their global integrity, the foreign 
investors ensure management to work well in 
the developing countries. Chen et al. (2006) 
and Chevalier et al. (2006) find that when the 
company has foreign ownership, the company’s 
performance will be positive, and the financial 
report published will be more trustworthy.
H5a : Higher proportion of foreign 
ownership reduces the probability 
of accounting fraud. 
Company Life Cycle and Probability of 
Accounting Fraud
Every company has a life cycle stages. 
Owen and Yawson (2010) divide the company 
life cycle into three cycles: young, mature, and 
old. Life cycle of the firm affects the component 
of company’s balance sheet, income statement 
and cash flow report (Savich and Thompson 
1978). It means that companies which have 
different firm life cycle will perform different 
earning management. Savich and Thomson 
(1978) also find that companies in the young 
and mature life cycle stage have tendency to 
do earning management. This paper draws on 
two separate views of an old stage firm life 
cycle:
1. Old stage firm life cycle has incentives to 
inflate earnings due to earnings decline.
2. Old stage firm life cycle has lower 
incentives to inflate earnings due to the 
declining financial condition of company. 
In this stage, the pressure to perform 
earning management is lower than the 
other stage (young and mature). This study 
refers to the second view and it is supported 
by the studies of Fouad and Riahi (2001). 
They find that companies which are in the 
young stage tend to choose accounting 
method which lowers the reported 
earnings because they need free cash 
flow for expansion and new investment. 
Companies which are in the mature stage 
tend to choose accounting method which 
increases reported earnings because they 
often using reported earnings-based bonus 
plans as a fixed salary component (Skinner 
1996). Therefore, reported earnings will 
play an important role in management 
performance evaluation (Smith and Watts 
1992).  According to Perols and Lougee 
(2011), if GAAP rules are broke, managed 
reported earnings (lowering or increasing 
reported earnings) will be charged as 
a fraud. Since the number of reported 
earnings seems to be very important for 
the young and mature firms, the tendency 
to perform earnings management that 
violates GAAP rules is higher for young 
and mature firm (commit to do fraud). 
Thus, companies that are at the young 
and mature life cycle stage will frequently 
conduct earnings management that leads to 
financial statement fraud.
H6a:   Companies which are in the young life 
cycle stage have higher probability of 
accounting fraud. 
H7a:   Companies  which  are  in  the mature 
life cycle stage have higher probability 
of accounting fraud.
Companies with a high debt ratio have 
incentive to violate the loan agreement because 
of the pressure on management to comply 
with the loan agreement, with assumption 
that the underperform company is under 
pressure to incorrect financial statements 
(Perols and Lougee 2011). Leverage is also 
a ratio to measure financial difficulties, and 
companies that have high leverage ratios tend 
to be investigated by the Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (Chen et al. 
2006). Leverage has a positive correlation with 
accounting policies which increase earnings. 
Companies with a high leverage ratio tend to 
be motivated to accrued smaller liability or 
larger asset in order to avoid violating debt 
covenant. From the previous research above, 
it is concluded that leverage has a positive 
correlation to companies’ probability of 
committing accounting fraud.
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Researches on the size in relation to fraud 
produce various conclusions. Park and Pastena 
(1991) conclude that the targeted companies 
penalized by SEC is over-the-counter firm 
which  is  relatively small. Persons (1995) 
states that firm size is negatively correlated to 
accounting fraud. Lee and Choi (2002) also 
find that small companies has  a tendency to 
do earnings management more frequently to 
avoid losses than large firms. However, Rezaei 
(2012) proves that the bigger the company, 
the more likely it is to commit earning 
management so that there will be a relationship 
between the positive discretionary accruals 
and profits in the future. Suwito and Herawaty 
(2005) find evidence that the larger companies 
have a greater incentive to perform income 
smoothing compared to the smaller companies. 
It is because the larger companies become the 
subject of examination (government and public 
pay more attention to the larger companies). 
Firm size is not just a number that stated the 
company's scale. Firm size can also determine 
what policy will be taken by the company in 
certain circumstances.
DATA AND METHOD
Sample Selection and Description
The population of this study is all non-
financial companies which are registered in 
Indonesian Stock Exchange in the years of 
2005–2011. The samples are all companies 
which were reported to have some accounting 
frauds by BAPEPAM-LK during those years. 
There are 47 companies reported as companies 
with problems in their financial reports. Then, 
47 companies which do not have problems 
with their financial reports are taken as paired 
samples. The total samples in this study are 
94. The criteria of sample selection are: (i) 
companies engaged in financial industry, 
insurance and banking were excluded from 
the sample; (ii) companies that do not have 
data or incomplete financial statements are not 
included; (iii) companies selected as the paired 
sample is a company that does not do fraud, 
has total assets of +/ - 30% of fraud firm total 
assets, and also in the same industry with the 
fraud firm. Sample selection is done through 
the matching process, following Beasley 
(1996) and Chen et al. (2006). The sample 
selection can be seen in Table 1.
The 47 fraud companies which are the 
sample of this study are divided into 9 industrial 
sectors classified by the BEI (Indonesian Stock 
Exchange). The sample distribution can be 
seen in Table 2. 
Table 3 shows the category of the 
financial reports with problems based on the 
BAPEPAM-LK valuation.
Research Design
 To test the hypothesis of this study, the 
regression logistics was used. The dependent 
variable in this study is a binary variable, 
that is, whether company was practicing 
fraud or not in their financial report. In this 
study, to determine the relationship between 
Table 1
Sample Description
Sample Description  Amount Percentage
Number of sample in 2005 1 2.13%
Number of sample in 2006 3 6.38%
Number of sample in 2007 12 25.53%
Number of sample in 2008 17 36.17%
Number of sample in 2009 3 6.38%
Number of sample in 2010 9 19.15%
Number of sample in 2011 2 4.26%
Total Sample 47 100%
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effectiveness of the board of commissioners, 
effectiveness of the audit committee, the 
role of bank monitoring, structure of family 
ownership, structure of foreign ownership, 
age, and life cycle of the company with fraud 
in their financial report, the following equation 
was used: 
P(FRAUD)i,t = α + β1 SCOREBDi,t 
+ β2 SCOREACi,t + 
β3 CREDITOR i,t  + 
β4 FAMOWNi,t  + β5 
FOREIGNi,t  + β6 
YOUNGi,t + β7 MATUREi,t  
+ β8 LVRGi,t  + β9 SIZEi,t + 
 YEARSi,t +  
INDUSTRYi,t + ε i,t
Where:
P(FRAUD)i,t  : Company i that is fraudulent 
at its financial report (fraud) 
at year t. This variable is 
originated from the information 
as given by the Bapepam-LK 
(Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal 
dan Lembaga keuangan- The 
Stock Exchange and Financial 
Institute Monitoring Board).
β1 SCOREBDi,t : Score index of the board of 
commissioners, that is the 
total score obtained divided by 
maximal score (that is 51).
β2 SCOREACi,t : Score index of  the audi t 
committee obtained, that is the 
total score obtained divided by 
the maximal score (that is 33).
β3 CREDITOR i,t : ratio of the amount of credit 
from  bank with a good credit 
monitoring quality divided by 
total asset of the  company i at 
the year t.
Table 2 
Distribution of the Sample Based on the Industry Sector
No Industry Sector Fraud Financial Statement
Percentage
1 Agriculture 3 6,38%
2 Mining 5 10,64%
3 Basic Industry and Chemical 7 14,89%
4 Miscellaneous Industry 4 8,51%
5 Consumer Goods Industry 3 6,38%
6 Property, Real Estate and Construction 4 8,51%
7 Infrastructure, Utility and Transportation 9 19,15%
8 Trade, Service and Investment 12 25,53%
Total Sample 47 100%
Table 3 
Category of the Financial Reports With Problems
Fraud Financial Statement Category Amount Percentage
Unintentional Misstatement 12 26%
Not in accordance with PSAK 6 13%
Deliberately Misstatement 5 11%
Disclosure 10 21%
Materiality and delays in the delivery of 
information material 14 30%
Total 47 100%
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β4 FAMOWN i,t : Variable dummy (1,0) with a 
value of 1 when the proportion 
of the Family’s ownership is > 
50% and 0 if the proportion of 
the family is < 50%. 
β5 FOREIGNi,t    : The foreign capital ownership 
is a proportion of the shares 
owned by the foreigner(s) from 
the total shares circulated. 
β6 YOUNGi,t         : The dummy variable (1,0) with 
a value of 1 if the company is 
in the Young life cycle category 
and 0 if others.
β7 MATUREi  : The dummy variable (1,0) with 
a value of 1 if the company is 
in the Mature life cycle category 
and 0 if others.
β8 LVRGi,t  : The value received from total 
liabilities divided by  total asset. 
Β9 SIZEi,t  : The natural logarithm from the 
book value of total asset of the 
company at the end of the fiscal 
year.
β10 YEARSi,t  : The dummy variable for the 
years effect.
β11 INDUSTRYi,t: The dummy variable for the 
industry effect
Variable Construction
The dependent variable in this study is 
accounting fraud. The data regarding this 
accounting fraud is derived from BAPEPAM-
LK from the years 2007-2011 in the form of 
sanctions published by BAPEPAM-LK. Based 
on this data, it has identified companies that 
have committed accounting fraud during the 
period of 2005-2011. The indicator used to 
value the dummy variable is the value 1 for 
companies which have committed accounting 
fraud.
The effectiveness score of board of 
commissioners and audit committee is 
calculated based on the values cumulated 
from the checklist as arranged by the 
characteristics of board of commissioners and 
audit committee, which include independency, 
activity, size, and competence. This checklist 
is developed by Hermawan (2009) and is used 
in the study to calculate the effectiveness score 
of the board of commissioners and the audit 
committee.  The score is calculated based on the 
total point from each question in the checklist. 
Each questions can obtained maximum value 
3 (three) for “Good” answer, 2 (two) for “Fair” 
answer, and minimum value 1 (one) for “Poor” 
answer. The total number of the questionnaire 
is 28 questions.
To calculate the score of board of 
commissioner, the questionnaire have 17 
checklist questions, consist of 6 questions to 
measure board independence, 6 questions 
to measure board activities, 1 question to 
measure board size, and 4 questions to measure 
board expertise and competence. Therefore, 
maximum score of board of commissioner 
can be obtained from the questionnaire is 51 
(17 questions x 3 for “Good” answer) and 
minimum score is 17 (17 questions x 1 for 
“Poor” answer).
To calculate score of audit committee, 
the questionnaire have 11 checklist questions, 
consist of 8 questions to measure audit 
committee activities, 1 question to measure 
audit committee size, and 2 questions to 
measure audit committee expertise and 
competence. Therefore, maximum score 
of audit committee can be obtained from 
the questionnaire is 33 (11 questions x 3 for 
“Good” answer) and minimum score is 11 (11 
questions x 1 for “Poor” answer).
Indonesia has adopted a two-tier system 
in the company's board structure, the board 
of commissioners and the board of directors. 
Board of commissioners is separated with the 
board of directors. The board of commissioners 
plays a role in providing supervision and 
overseeing the board of directors in managing 
the company. In the studies conducted in 
other countries that are mostly one-tier 
system, the term of board of directors does 
not have the same meaning as the one used in 
Indonesia, but its role are similar to the role 
of the board of commissioners  in companies 
in Indonesia. Thus, in this study, the term of 
board will be used for the board of directors in 
a one-tier system, while the term of board of 
commissioners will be used for companies that 
adopt a two tier system.
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The bank as a creditor has the capacity 
to control the company which has become its 
debtor in the framework to ensure the safeness 
of the given loan. The controlling level done 
by the banks can be different from each other, 
depending on the quality of credit monitoring 
system from each bank. A bank which has a 
good performance, especially in its credit 
management, is a reflection of corporate 
governance of the company. This study has 
determined the classification of the bank that 
has good monitoring abilities (Hermawan 
2009 and Ahmadina 2011) based on the 
following criteria: (1) Bank is bank which 
has a total asset of above IDR 1 trillion based 
on the ranking data of  Infobank publication 
2006-2012; (2) Bank must have a “very good” 
and “good” rating according to Infobank 
publication 2006-2012; (3) Bank has a Non 
Performing Loan (NPL) rating under 5% based 
on the ranking data of Infobank  publication 
2006-2012. The bank which fulfills these three 
criteria is considered to be the bank that has 
conducted the debtor monitoring well, so that it 
has become one of the mechanism of corporate 
governance. Ahn and Choi (2009) have used 
the proxy to measure the monitoring rate using 
the loan amount given by the bank compared 
to the total asset owned by the company, the 
amount of loan which is calculated is the loan 
received by the bank which is included in the 
group of banks that have fulfilled the criteria as 
explained before.    
According to Arifin (2003), companies 
with family ownership are defined as companies 
in which their shares of ownership is > 5% (in 
which their names are mentioned in financial 
reports) and are not owned by government, 
financial institution, or society (individual 
whose  ownership is not mentioned in the 
financial report). In this study, the dummy 
variable (1, 0) is used with a value of 1 if the 
company with family ownership proportion is 
> 50% and 0 if the family ownership proportion 
is ≤ 50%.
According to Said et al. (2009), the 
foreign ownership is explained in the form of 
the amount of proportion of shares owned by 
a foreign party compared to the total shares 
circulated. Data of the foreign ownership 
is obtained from KSEI (Kustodian Sentral 
Efek Indonesia/The Indonesian Central Stock 
Custodian). 
This study has divided the life cycle 
of company into three stages of life cycles 
Table 4






Min Max  Mean  Median Standard 
deviation 
Independence 6
Fraud 7 15 9.77 10 2.20
Pairsample 7 15 10.64 10 1.97
Total 7 15 10.20 10 2.12
Activity 6
Fraud 6 18 12.53 14 3.60
Pairsample 6 18 12.79 12 2.89
Total 6 18 12.66 13 3.25
Size 1
Fraud 1 3 1.64 1 0.94
Pairsample 1 3 1.74 1 0.97
Total 1 3 1.69 1 0.95
Competency 4
Fraud 4 12 9.72 10 2.07
Pairsample 6 12 10.19 10 1.33
Total 4 12 9.96 10 1.75
Total Score 17
Fraud 21 44 33.66 34 21
Pairsample 24 48 35.36 35 24
Total 21 48 34.51 34.5 5.19
* Each questions can obtain a value of 1 for the lowest value and 3 for the highest
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(young, mature and old), that is: The category 
of companies that may have a possibility to 
conduct fraud (companies that are in the young 
and mature stages of their life cycle), and the 
category of companies that have a low tendency 
to conduct fraud (companies that are in the old 
stage of their life cycle). Base on DeAngelo 
et al. (2006) study, retained earnings, which is 
measured as proportion of total equity (RE/TE), 
is used as a proxy to calculate company’s life 
cycle stage. This proxy can measure whether 
the firms use financing that rely on internal or 
external parties for funding. Companies with 
the lower levels of RE/TE tend to be in the 
growth phase stage capital formation, while 
firms with a higher level of RE/TE tend to be 
in the mature and old stage with profits that 
have been accumulated so that the company 
can make self-financing.
LIFECYCLE i,t  =  Retained Earningsi,t   : Total 
Equityi,t
Explanation:
LIFECYCLEi,t : Dummy variable (1,0) from 
the company’s life cycle i at year t, that is:
1. Young i,t   = 1 for companies with a young 
life cycle and = 0 if others
2. Mature i,t  = 1 for companies with a 
mature life cycle and = 0 others
Retained Earningsi,t: company’s retained 
earnings i at year t 
Total Equityi,t : total value of the company’s 
equity i at year t
The company’s life cycle is determined 
by putting the companies in the right order 
based on RE/TE proxy ratio, after which, 
25% companies with the highest RE/TE are 
categorized in the old stage of their life cycle, 
whereas 25% the companies with the lowest 
RE/TE are categorized as companies which 
are in the young stage of their life cycle. The 
rest are categorized into companies which are 
in the mature stage of their life cycle.
RESULT 
Descriptive Statistics
The mean score for the board of 
commissioners is 34.51. It can be concluded 
that  all research observation has an effective 
board of commissioners (Table 4).
In general, the board of commissioners in 
the whole research observation does not have 
a good independency characteristic (mean 
10.22, whereas the maximum value can be 
obtain is 18). Mean for the activity category 
(total number of board meeting) is 12.66, 
where as the maximum value can be obtain 
is 18, this figure explains that the activity 
Table 5






Min Max Mean Median Standard 
deviation
Activity 8
Fraud 8 23 14.91 15.00 4.79
Pairsample 8 23 16.06 16.00 3.82
Total 8 23 15.49 15.00 4.35
Size 1
Fraud 1 3 2.04 2.00 0.55
Pairsample 1 3 2.00 2.00 0.36
Total 1 3 2.02 2.00 0.46
Competency 2
Fraud 2 6 4.13 5.00 1.70
Pairsample 2 6 5.09 5.00 1.21
Total 2 6 4.61 5.00 1.55
Total Score 11
Fraud 11 32 21.09 22.00 6.16
Pairsample 11 31 23.15 23.00 4.58
Total 11 32 22.12 22.00 5.50
* Each questions can obtain a value of 1 for the lowest value and 3 for the highest
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characteristics of board of commissioners 
in this observation has an averaged of good 
activity.  The mean for the category size of 
board of commissioners is 1.69, which means 
that most of the observations in this study 
have less than five members of commissioners 
board. For the competence category, the 
mean is 9.96 which mirrors that the board of 
commissioners in this observation study has a 
relative good competence. In total, the average 
score of board of commissioners is 34.5, which 
means that the board of commissioners in this 
study has a medium level of effectiveness in 
average. 
Table 5 shows that the average mark of 
activity characteristics is 15.49, which means 
that in average the audit committee in this 
observation study has a relative medium 
activity. The valuation criteria used when the 
minimum members of the audit committee are 
based on the minimum standard decided by the 
BEI and BAPEPAM-LK, three persons, will 
have a fair mark. Therefore, the average value 
for the category size of the audit committee is 
2.02. For the category competence, the mean 
is 4.61, indicates that most of the observation 
studies of audit committee member have 
educational background in accounting. In 
addition, this value also indicates that the 
age of audit committee members in this 
observation study is relative young.  In total, 
audit committee has an average score of 
22.12, which means that the effectiveness 
of audit committee role in this observation 
study in the average is at the medium level. In 
general, companies which are fraudulent have 
in average after lower score compared to the 
pair sample companies. This can indicates that 
the effectiveness of audit committee role of the 
fraudulent company is lower compared to the 
pair sample company. 
Empirical Tests
Table 6 shows that the categories of 
questions about the independency have a P 
value < 0.05, which means that for the non 
normal distribution data, there is a significant 
difference in the independence between 
fraudulent companies and those that do not 
conduct fraud. 
Table 6 




Independence    0.035 *
Size 0.566
Competency 0.616
* Significance level at  α=5%
Based on Table 7, the questions about the 
competence have a P value < 0.05. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that for the non normal 
distribution data, there is significant difference 
regarding the competence between the 
fraudulent and non fraudulent companies.
This study uses logistic regression to test 
the effectiveness of board of commissioners, 
effectiveness of audit committee, monitoring 
bank, family ownership, foreign ownership, 
and the firm life cycle in the probability of 
fraud occurrence. The logistic regression test 
is presented in Table 8. Looking at Count R2 
= 63% and the total significant variables at 
Table 8, it can be concluded that the model can 
predict 63% accurately. 
Table 7




Competency   0.014 *
 * Significance level at α=5%
Based on the result of logistic regression in 
Table 8, it can be seen that variable SCOREBD 
has a negative coefficient, however it is not 
significant at α= 10%. The result of the test 
shows that the score of board of commissioners 
does not have any effect on the probability of 
fraud. This means that an effective board of 
commissioners will not lessen the probability 
of fraud occurance in financial report. Hence, 
this result does not support the hypothesis 1a so 
that hypothesis 1a is rejected. The result of this 
study is consistent with the study conducted 
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by Jia et al. (2009), which examined some 
characteristics of the board, among others, 
number of meeting, board’s size, board’s 
tenure, and age of the board members. Some 
of those variables do not show a significant 
testing result. The variable that does not show 
the effects are the board size, tenure of board, 
and age of the board members. The studies of 
Uzun et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2006) do 
not find any association between the size of 
board and the number of meetings with fraud.
Based on the logistic regression in Table 8, 
it can be seen that the variable SCOREAC has 
a consistent negative effect, and is significant 
at α= 5%. The result of its testing shows 
that the value of audit committee affects the 
probability that fraud will occur. This means 
that fraud in financial report can be decreased 
by an effective audit committee. The result 
supports hypothesis 2a, so that hypothesis 
2 cannot be rejected.  The existence of the 
effect of effective audit committee on the 
probability of fraud as proved in this study 
supports the results of the study conducted 
by Rezaee (2003). He finds that the function 
of an effective audit committee will prevent 
the probability of fraud occurrence. Rezaee 
also includes some frauds in some American 
companies, due to the ineffectiveness of audit 
committee. The study of Jackson et al. (2009) 
finds that the probability of fraud occurrences 
in financial reports is related to the audit 
committee’s independence and the number of 
meetings of the audit committee.
The result of the regression in Table 
8 shows that the variable CREDITOR has 
a negative coefficient, however, it is not 
significant at α = 10%. The result of the test 
shows that the value of CREDITOR does not 
affect the probability that fraud will occur. 
This means that the role of monitoring from 
the bank could not decrease the possibility 
that fraud will happen in financial report. 
This result does not support hypothesis of 
3a, so that the hypothesis 3a is rejected. Most 
studies in the past have not dealt with the role 
of the creditor as a mechanism of corporate 
governance. Until recently, only the study of 
Ahn and Choi (2009), Hermawan (2009) and 
Ahmadina (2011) have become the basis for 
this study. In contrast to earlier findings by Ahn 
and Choi, this study finds that the role of the 
monitoring bank will not influence towards the 
lessening the probability to conduct fraud. This 
may have been caused by the low proportion 
of bank loan, especially from banks with good 
monitoring ability towards the capital structure 
of this observation study. This indicates that 
the bank, as the external party in corporate 
governance of company, has not played the 
monitoring role well. The monitoring bank 
is not as effective as the monitoring role of 
the company’s internal. One of the reasons is 
the limitation of information which may have 
been obtained by the external party because of 
its position outside the company.
The result of the regression in Table 8 
shows that variable FAMOWN has a negative 
coefficient, and is significant at α= 10%. The 
result shows that the control of family affects 
the probability of fraud occurrence, so this 
study supports hypothesis 4a, and thus the 
hypothesis 4a is not rejected. This means that 
fraud in financial report can be decreased by the 
increasing of controlled family ownership. The 
result of this testing supports Arifin’s (2003) 
study which shows that public companies in 
Indonesia controlled by families have less 
agency problem if compared to companies 
controlled by public or without a majority 
shareholders. According to him, in companies 
that are controlled by families, there is less 
agency problems because of the decrease of 
conflicts between principal and agent. If the 
family ownership is more efficient and the 
agency is better, there is no problem between 
the interest of agent and principal, which means 
that the management will lead the company  as 
well as possible for the benefit of the “family”, 
so that the company will be run efficiently and 
honestly.  
The testing of hypothesis 5a shows that 
FOREIGN variable has negative coefficient. 
However it is not significant at α = 10%. This 
testing means capital structure which owned 
by foreign has no significant influence to the 
probability of fraud occurrence in Indonesia. 
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This result support Jia et al. (2009) and 
Chen et al. (2006)  study, which shows that 
foreign ownership doesn’t have effects on  the 
probability of fraud.
The life cycle of firm doesn’t have 
significant effect on the probability of fraud. 
Table 8 shows that variable YOUNG and 
MATURE have positive coefficient, although 
Table 8
Logistic Regression Result 
P(FRAUD)i,t = α + β1 SCOREBDi,t + β2 SCOREACi,t + β3 CREDITOR i,t  + β4 FAMOWNi,t  + β5 FOREIGNi,t  + 
β6 YOUNGi,t + β7 MATUREi,t  + β8 LVRGi,t  + β9 SIZEi,t +   YEARSi,t +  INDUSTRYi,t + ε i,t
Variables Exp. Sign Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob
C -0.353 6.421 -0.055 0.478
SCOREBD - -2.933 2.992 -0.980 0.163
SCOREAC - -2.789 1.732 -1.611 0.054*
CREDITOR - -1.891 2.382 -0.794 0.214
FAMOWN - -0.787 0.554 -1.419 0.078*
FOREIGN - -1.239 1.104 -1.122 0.131
YOUNG + 0.486 0.715 0.679 0.248
MATURE + 0.421 0.609 0.691 0.245
LVRG + 0.809 0.503 1.606 0.054*
SIZE + 0.124 0.217 0.573 0.283
YEAR2006 0.420 1.931 0.217 0.414
YEAR2007 0.951 1.584 0.600 0.274
YEAR2008 1.148 1.597 0.719 0.236
YEAR2009 2.448 1.939 1.263 0.103
YEAR2010 1.524 1.690 0.902 0.183
YEAR2011 0.454 1.873 0.242 0.404
ANINDUSTRI -0.554 1.486 -0.373 0.355
INDBRGKONS -0.294 1.198 -0.245 0.403
INDDSRKIMIA 0.321 1.319 0.244 0.404
DGNGJASAINV -0.132 1.483 -0.089 0.465
PERTAMBANGAN 0.007 1.107 0.006 0.498
PROPERTI -0.183 1.484 -0.123 0.451
TRANSINFRA -0.578 0.986 -0.586 0.279
McFadden R-squared 0.089 Count R2 63%
** Significance level α = 5%  (one-tailed) 
  * Significance level α = 10% (one-tailed)
Total Observation is 94, FRAUD = Companies that get the sanction from Bapepam-LK; SCOREBD = Board of 
Director effectiveness score; SCOREAC = Audit Committee effectiveness score; CREDITOR = Ratio of Total Amount 
of Lending from Bank which have good monitoring divided by company total asset; FAMOWN =  dummy variable 
(1,0) value with 1 if family ownership proportion > 50% and value with 0 if family ownership proportion < 50%; 
FOREIGN = proportion of stock owns by foreign divided by total outstanding stock; YOUNG = dummy variable (1,0) 
with value with 1 if firm on young life cycle stage and value with 0 if others; MATURE = dummy variable (1,0) value 
with 1 if firm on mature life cycle stage and value with 0 if others; LVRG = Total liabilities divided by total asset; 
SIZE = Natural logarithm from total asset book value at the end of fiscal year
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it is not significant at α= 10%. One possible 
reason that cause this test is not significant 
is fraud does not occur through earnings 
management, such as misstatement, materiality, 
violated disclosure, and disclosure of facts 
material that is not true, therefore the effect 
cannot be captured through measurement of 
the company life cycle stage. Other possible 
reason is the proxy of this variable cannot 
accurately capture at which stage the life cycle 
of the firm.  
Based on Table 8, the control variable 
leverage has a positive coefficient at level 5%. 
This means that the greater the leverage of a 
company, the greater the probability of fraud 
will occur. This result has been supported 
by the following studies. Perols and Lougee 
(2011) have observed that companies which 
have a high debt ratio have the potential to 
conduct violations towards loan agreements, 
because there is a strong pressure towards 
the management to obey the loan agreement, 
assuming that companies with bad performances 
are pressured to conduct fraud in their financial 
reports. Leverage is positively correlated with 
the accounting policy to increase profit. If the 
management policy of increasing the profit 
is not sufficient to avoid violation of the debt 
covenant, manager will tend to be motivated 
to acknowledge the smaller obligation or to 
admit larger asset (Persons 2005).   
Based on Table 8, control variable size 
has a positive coefficient. However, it is not 
significant at level of 10%. The result of the 
test shows that size does not affect fraud 
probability. This study support the previous 
study of Jia et al. (2009) which have proven 
that size does not affect the probability of fraud 
occurrence. The other control variable years 
and industry also have positive coefficient, but 
it is not significant at level of 10%. This means 
that time and type of industry do not affect the 
probability of fraud occurrence.
  CONCLUSION
This study is aimed at testing whether 
there are effects of the effectiveness score of 
board of commissioners, effectiveness score 
of audit committee, monitoring role of bank, 
family ownership, control of capital from the 
foreign capital, and the life cycle of company 
on the fraud occurrence on financial report. 
Based on the analysis of results discussed 
above, the following conclusion can be drawn:
The effectiveness score of board of 
commissioners has no effect on the probability 
of fraud occurrence in financial report. This 
means that the performance of effective 
board of commissioners does not make lower 
the probability of fraud. The effectiveness 
score of audit committee has a negative and 
significant effect on the probability that fraud 
will occur in financial report. This indicates 
that the more effective the performance of 
audit committee, the smaller the probability 
of fraud occurrence. There is a distinction 
among the independency characteristics of the 
board of commissioners between companies 
doing fraud and not. Whereas, for the audit 
committee characteristics, there is a difference 
between the characteristics of competence 
between companies which conduct fraud and 
not conduct.  
 The role of monitoring of bank does not 
affect the probability of fraud occurrence. This 
means that the loan ratio from the bank with 
the ability of good monitoring divided by the 
total asset will not lower the probability of 
committing fraud. This indicates that banks as 
the external party in thecorporate governance of 
company fail to play the monitoring role well. 
The role of monitoring by bank as the external 
party in the corporate governance of company 
cannot be as effective as the monitoring role 
played by the company’s internal part.
 The ownership structure of the company 
shows that the company with foreign ownership 
could not lessen the probability of the fraud 
occurrence.
 The life cycle of company at the young 
stage has no significant effect on the probability 
of fraud occurence . This means that fraud can 
happen at different stages of the life cycle of 
company. The life cycle of company at the 
mature stage will not significantly affect the 
probability of fraud occurrence in financial 
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report. This means that fraud can happen at 
different stages of company life cycle.  
 These findings provide implications that 
can become contributions for some parties, 
such as for a company, based on the above 
results, the company is expected to make 
thoughtful considerations when deciding 
the company’s policies of company, such as 
increase in the application of good corporate 
governance, especially the improvement 
of the audit committee role effectiveness. 
In the election company's capital structure, 
ownership of which is controlled by the family 
will have a lower probability to commit fraud, 
so it would be better if a company's capital 
structure to have larger portion for family (> 
50%). 
 Several limitations of this study need to be 
acknowledged. First, this study focuses only on 
the BAEPEPAM-LK fraud report of the year 
2007-2011. As data become available in the 
upcoming years, future studies may re-examine 
the issue. Second, corporate governance is 
measured by effectiveness score of board 
of commissioner and audit committee only. 
There are other criteria mechanism to measure 
corporate governance, such as competency, 
duration, director’s independence, internal 
audit report mechanism, and competency of 
external audit firm. This study relies only on 
secondary data in evaluating the score board of 
commissioner and audit committee. The proxy 
of firm life cycle may not be able to describe 
the stages of the cycle accurately.
 In future research, it might be possible 
to extend the research period, such as (i) 
using other variables in measuring corporate 
governance, such as the board of directors 
variables (age, gender, hours of work, 
competencies, and outside or inside director), 
internal audit (whether the internal audit is 
reported to audit committee or to management, 
competency members of the internal audit), or 
external audits (Big Four or non Big Four); 
(ii) obtaining an index score of boards of 
commissioners and audit committees by using 
data other than secondary data (annual financial 
report) with questionnaires or surveys to better 
reflect the condition of board of commissioners 
and audit committees; (iii) using different 
ways for control sample selection; or (iv) use 
another proxy in measuring life cycle stages, 
such as average sales growth or dividend pay-
out rate.
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